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The Trouble with "Natural Law"

In Theology, Ethics and Strategy
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This one is going to be very controversial. We ask that you keep an open mind in keeping with our sincerity on this matter – we’ve done the work to make this case, and to make the point why failing to adopt this as true becomes a critical failure point when going up against ruthless criticism. The Postmodern NeoMarxists will always attempt to attack your worldview at least one level deeper than you are prepared to defend. At the deepest levels of belief, and under withering criticism, we must find that “natural law,” like the emperor, has no clothes.

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Here, we will examine the deeply obfuscated and much debated basis of “natural law,” that philosophy of Aristotle as adapted and adopted by Aquinas toward a synthetic result wherein Scripture, and the foremost presuppositions of Christendom, were the victims of “aufheben.” Though intent is surely debatable, this was nonetheless the practical effect of importing the pagan, man-made philosophy of Aristotle into Christian theology, and in adopting it as an exegetical lens contrary to the plain instruction of Scripture itself.

While much of the lesson here is deeply theological, and unapologetically from the viewpoint of a reformed, covenantal, and presupositionally theonomic viewpoint, the ethical, strategic, sociological, epistemological, and ontological conclusions must also hold weight with the secular, and any who would call themselves a member of the anti-Left, anti-Woke alliance.

In the final analysis, claims to the “universality” of “natural law” are dependent on the adopted of usually unstated presuppositions that stand outside of God’s word, yet still represent a form of faith and religiosity.

“Aristotle orients his ethical views on the presupposition of “telos,” or “purpose,” in all things. A thing is “good” to the degree that it suits its purpose. Man, per Aristotle, has a purpose of living a “rational” and “virtuous” life. However, a perusal of Aristotle’s basis of “virtue” finds no explicit “lawgiver,” and a mere pursuit of a “golden mean” somewhere between points of extremes in behavior that becomes, by virtue of not being in the extreme, and in accordance with the presupposed telos, “ethical.” This leaves the determination of precisely where this “golden mean” falls between the extremes a matter of debate and “rational” exploration. In reality, this represents a relativistic framework that is manipulable by those with the means to control information and the conversation.

The telos of Aristotle, also, is not according to Christian presuppositions. First, the purpose of man, as given by traditional Christian theology, is to enjoy God in obedience forever. God calls man not to a “golden mean” of relativistic behavior, but to abandon his rational attempts to reconcile his perspective with that of our Lord, as Proverbs 3:5 instructs: "Trust in the Lord with all your heart and do not lean on your own understanding." Indeed, the ultimate purpose of man is to "fear God and keep His commandments," as Ecclesiastes 12:13 concludes, "because this applies to every person." Thus, we must jettison manmade philosophy and come into settled agreement with the Law Word of God in Scripture, which, as 2 Timothy 3:16-17 affirms, is "inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be adequate, equipped for every good work." Scripture is plainly written, accessible to all who would but study, and requires no special, intimate connection to the “mind of god.”

Aristotle roots his fundamental presuppositions on “nature,” which is to say he roots his entire system of belief not on what is revealed explicitly, but implicitly, and by utilizing the discerning faculties in observation of the world. This faculty is posited as “universal,” though perhaps not actualized in utility by all persons. Yet, this "nature" isn’t a neutral foundation; it’s laden with unexamined presuppositions about cosmic order, accessible only through subjective interpretation. Far from being universal, this framework hides its reliance on specific perspectives popular in ancient Greek theology, undermining its objectivity and pointing, instead, at esoteric underpinnings.

This ought to be properly viewed as an obfuscation of presuppositions, because this “nature,” and the methods by which these faculties are utilized to “discern,” are, themselves, not the deepest layer of Aristotle’s philosophy. No, Aristotle’s philosophy, like Plato’s before him, was rooted in the esoteric milieu – from creation mythos and beyond – of the dualistic, pantheistic, monadism and similar theology common among the philosophers of the ancient world – a theology awash in the concept of aligning one’s mind with that of god and receiving direct revelation (recollection). This comes through in Aristotle’s discussion of Metaphysics, and, though treated as mere discussion without explicit endorsement, it aligns well with Plato’s Timaeus, and the “living universe” concept of the esoterica of all ages.

The concept of “natural law,” though not named as such by Aristotle, rooted in Aristotle’s “natural justice,” presupposes a “universal” standard of justice and ethics, such that something such as murder might transcend borders and customs to be applicable to all people in all places. This is alleged to be accessible to all through “reason,” and observation of nature. Appeals to the obvious lack of a basis for this claim to universality, such as pointing to the very many countries on earth where forms of murder are lawful, considered just, and pursued zealously, are often met with obfuscation suggesting that persons can suppress this “truth,” and act against it, yet some plurality of people still understand it as “true” that murder is wrong. This concept closely aligns with the esoteric concept of Rousseau’s “general will,” which like “natural law,” is a logical extension of the concept of Hermetic gnosis and Plato’s “golden” caste of philosopher kings who have special access to knowledge necessary to align the polity to History, and move towards an esoteric eschaton.

Further, Aristotle’s “natural law” introduced the concept of “equity” to align legal justice with “natural justice,” in finding that certain applications of “just” law are not, in reality, “just” when carried out under specific circumstances that might include aggravating or mitigating circumstances. This should be recognized as the playground of the Postmodernists, who did not by any stretch invent their techniques, by stretching principles of ethics, law and rules to the very edge cases where it appears as though the principle itself is no longer legitimate in order to delegitimize the political order.

This point is made not to, necessarily, align Aristotle with the Postmodernists or their methods, but to demonstrate that their method comes directly and logically from this concept of “equity” in application of law, and it is necessarily so because it, from the beginning, rejects the absolute justness of God’s law. It is only in the law of God that principles of justice, properly understood and applied impartially, can never be said to be unjust no matter how close one gets to the edge of the principle – this is necessarily the case as God, being the lawgiver, defines good and evil. As James 4:12 declares, "There is only one Lawgiver and Judge, the One who is able to save and to destroy," challenging those who judge apart from this divine authority. Moreover, Psalm 19:7 affirms, "The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple," establishing God’s law as the ultimate standard.

What we will put forward, then, and with considerable outcry we’re sure, is that “natural law” represents nothing more than a form of camouflage “gnosis.” Where it departs from the gnosis of Hermetic texts is only in the denial of its own origins, as “gnosis” is generally sought to claim a higher ascendency of mind towards the divine, but this version seeks rather to deny this sort of direct revelation of the mind of god in favor of obfuscating its brand under the guise of “reason.” This mirrors the manner in which dialecticians have obfuscated esoteric, ancient-Greek metaphysics and theology under the guise of both “science” and “psychology” in modern times. Despite the denials the practical effect is the same: a cadre of elites exercising narrative control get to claim special access to divine knowledge that shapes society.

Put another way, an assertion of “natural law” by any person as a justification of any decision or action is no different at all from an assertion of the reliability of one person’s faculties of observation, reason, discernment, and wisdom in determining what is not readily apparent to the second person. Claims of “natural law” boil down to personal authority—trust in one’s reason and insight to discern hidden truths. Such assertions stand or fall on the ability of the first person to be correct in a way that approaches, if not implies, divinity. Absent that claim to mental divinity, and the implied existence of some lawgiver to which his mind is connected in making such a claim, the authority for such a claim stands only on the authority of that person making it. In other words, the moment that the claim of “gnatural law” via faculties of reason is rightly rejected, that first person’s claims stand on a foundation of sand. It is that foundation that we see crumbling all around us in the advance of Postmodern Marxism, as it takes beach after beach, in its plain rejection of this obscured gnostic legitimation, and the substitution of its own nihilism, as this false pillar of society falls.

Natural Law Theory, and its dependency on the supposed “telos” of man, observation of “nature,” and the “goodness” of whatever aligns with man's purpose, has no answer as to why Adam and Eve ought not have eaten the fruit that precipitated the fall. There’s no biblical reason to believe the fruit itself was somehow poisonous – indeed, they did not die (immediately) after consuming it. The natural law view must recognize that they followed their biological imperative for subsistence and ate from a plant that suited that need. It’s only upon the introduction of obedience to the Word – a “theonomy” of self-governance – that any ethical transgression is demonstrable in this act. For Genesis 2:16-17 records, "The Lord God commanded the man, saying, ‘From any tree of the garden you may eat freely; but from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat from it you will surely die.’" Yet, as Genesis 3:6 describes, "When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable to make one wise, she took from its fruit and ate; and she gave also to her husband with her, and he ate." Their sin was not a violation of natural law but of God’s explicit command, as Jesus later emphasized in John 14:15: "If you love Me, you will keep My commandments."

The scriptures oft quoted in defense of "natural law" refer not to the reliability of man’s reason at all, but only to the culpability of man in his own sin such that punishment is not arbitrary or cruel, but just and deserved. In this manner "natural law" represents a subtle overturning of the doctrine of man’s total depravity, and suggests a Christ-less path to man-made salvation by turning inward to sensory perception and meditation.

On this basis “natural law” must fall.”

p.s. this is not intended to “divide,” nor call into question the genuineness of professions of faith by those subscribing to Natural Law Theory, many of whom are good brothers and sisters in Christ. This is, however, necessary, in our estimation, as a foundation for further reformation towards a more perfect expression of God’s expectations for us, and for our advance on the gates of Hell.

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